Abstract-We study collusion-resistant traitor tracing in the simple decoder approach, i.e. assignment of scores for each user separately. We introduce a new score function for non-binary bias-based traitor tracing. It has three special properties that have long been sought after: (i) The expected score of an innocent user is 0 in each content position. (ii) The variance of an innocent user's score is 1 in each content position. (iii) The expectation of the coalition's score does not depend on the collusion strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Collusion-resistant tracing
Forensic watermarking is a means for tracing the onglO and (re-)distribution of digital content. Before distribution, the content is modified by embedding an imperceptible watermark, which plays the role of a personalized serial number. When an unauthorized copy of the content is found, the identities of those users who participated in its creation can be determined from the watermark. A tracing algorithm outputs a list of suspicious users.
Collusion attacks are a powerful class of attacks against forensic watermarking. Multiple attackers (referred to as col htders or a coalition) combine their differently watermarked versions of the same content. The observed differences point to the locations of the hidden marks. Knowledge of these locations helps the colluders to mix and match their versions.
Different types of collusion-resistant codes have been de veloped in order to defend against these attacks. The most popular in the recent literature is the class of bias-based codes. These were introduced by G. Tardos in 2003. The original paper [1] was followed by a lot of activity, e.g. improved analyses [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , code modifications [8] , [9] , [10] , decoder modifications [11] , [12] , [13] and various WIFS '2013, November 18-21, 2013 , Guangzhou, China. ISBN 978-1-4673-5593-3 ©2013 IEEE.
generalizations [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . The advantage of bias based versus deterministic codes is that they can achieve the asymptotically optimal relationship g ex c2 between the sufficient code length g and the coalition size c.
We distinguish between two kinds of tracing algorithm: (i) simple decoders, which assign a score to individual users and (ii) joint decoders [11] , [12] , [13] , which look at sets of users. Joint decoders sometimes employ a simple decoder as a bootstrapping step. Tardos' original scheme [1] and its symmetrized version [15] work with a simple decoder. The Amiri-Tardos accusation scheme [11] and the Don Quixote scheme [13] are examples of joint decoders.
In the study of collusion-resistant watermarking one often uses a model in which the details of the watermark embedding process have been abstracted away. The content is considered to consist of a number of 'segments', 'positions' or 'locations' into each of which a symbol from an alphabet Q can be embedded. A position in which not all the colluders have received the same symbol is called a detectable position. It is customary to assume that the so-called Marking Assumption holds: the colluders are able to modify the watermark only in detectable positions. Furthermore, one often adopts the Restricted Digit Model (RDM) as attacker model because of its simplicity and amenability to analysis. The RDM states that the attackers may only output a symbol from the set of symbols they received (and not for instance an erasure, a different symbol, or a mixture of multiple symbols). The RDM respects the Marking Assumption.
Most of the literature on content tracing works with a binary alphabet. However, it has been shown that larger alphabets can offer a higher fingerprinting rate: in the RDM the fingerprinting capacity in the large c limit is given [18] by Cq = (q -1)/(2c2 1n q), where q = IQI is the alphabet size.
In this paper we focus on score functions for simple-decoder bias-based tracing in the case of arbitrary-size coalitions and non-binary alphabets. We work in the Restricted Digit Model.
B. Related work
The symmetrized version of Tardos' original score func tion for q = 2 has asymptotic (large c) fingerprinting rate 2/ (c21f2 In 2), which is roughly a factor 2.5 below capacity.
Its generalization [15] to q � 3 outperforms [19] the binary scheme but is far below the q-ary capacity.
Amiri and Tardos [11] devised a capacity-achieving joint decoder for q = 2. Unfortunately, it is computationally intensive since it requires looking at all candidate coalitions. A non-binary version has not yet been described, though generalization seems straightforward. The 'Divide and Conquer' scheme for q-ary alphabets, in troduced by Laarhoven et al. [20] , works in the dy namic setting (e.g. pay-TV broadcast), where the content tracer immediately sees the result of the attack on a position and uses this information to decide which symbols to distribute in the next position. This approach intertwines several 'ordinary' Tardos schemes of lower alphabet size. Its asymptotic fingerprinting rate is � q � l Cq when instantiated with the symmetric Tardos score. In this paper we will not consider the dynamic setting.
There are several studies of bias-based fingerprinting in attack models that deviate from the Marking Assumption and the RDM. Some of these introduce modified simple-decoder score functions. For instance, one can allow noise addition and fusion of symbols; generalized score functions for these attack models were proposed and analyzed in [16] , [17] .
Kuribayashi [21] introduced a score function modification for the binary case that aims to exploit imbalances between the Os and 1 s in the attacked content.
The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm [12] was introduced as an iterative joint decoder. It estimates a candidate coalition. Based on this set of users it estimates the employed collusion strategy. Then the simple-decoder score function is modified to act specifically against this collusion strategy. The scores are used to find suspicious users, and the whole procedure is repeated. For q = 2 a formula was given [12] for computing a score function optimized against an estimated strategy.
This was extended to arbitrary alphabet size by Oosterwijk et al. [22] , and furthermore analytic expressions were obtained for the score functions optimized against the Interleaving, Majority Vo ting, Minority Vo ting, Random Symbol and AII High strategy. The score function tailored against Interleaving (,Interleaving defense') is special. For this score it was shown [23] that the saddlepoint of a minimax game between the coalition and the tracer is given by the same configuration that was found by Huang and Moulin [24] for the capacity game: the Interleaving attack combined with the Dirichlet bias distribution (with concentration parameter �). At the saddle point the asymptotic fingerprinting rate achieved by the Inter leaving defense is exactly Cq . In other words: (i) for large c there is no better simple-decoder scheme than the Interleaving defense together with the Dirichlet bias distribution; (ii) the most powerful attack against this scheme is the Interleaving strategy; (iii) the scheme achieves asymptotic capacity.
C. Contributions
We introduce a special score function for non-binary bias based fingerprinting. It has three interesting properties, which hold in each content position:
1) The expected score of an innocent user is zero.
2) The variance of an innocent user's score is one.
3) The expectation of the colluders' summed scores does not depend on the collusion strategy. We also find a continuous bias distribution that optimizes the asymptotic performance of the scheme. In the case of a binary alphabet our scheme reduces exactly to the symmetrized Tardos fingerprinting scheme.
The combination of the above three simplifying properties, exhibited by the binary Tardos scheme, has been long sought after for q > 2 and is regarded as something of a holy grail. Unfortunately the asymptotic performance of the grail is not good. The asymptotic fingerprinting rate is a decreasing function of q. Thus it performs worse than the q-ary scheme of Skoric et al. [15] , which has a rate that is almost constant at approximately 0.3/c2 [19] , and far worse than the capacity achieving Interleaving defense [23] .
In this light our newly found scheme is somewhat of an anticlimax. After a long quest for a bias-based q-ary scheme with precisely the same special properties as the symmetrized binary Tardos scheme, the prize seems to be a mere curiosity. Perhaps it has a role to play at small coalition sizes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Code construction, collusion attack, and simple decoder
We briefly summarize the basics of bias-based codes ('Tar dos codes') in the Restricted Digit Model and the notation used in this paper.
The number of users is n. The set {I, ... , n} is denoted as [n] . The content has e positions in which a symbol can be The coalition is a set of users C C [n]. They observe a subset of X, which we denote as Xc . They perform their attack based on Xc . In the Restricted Digit Model, they are allowed to choose, in each position, one symbol that they observed in that position. Their output symbol is denoted as y. Their strategy for choosing y may be nondeterministic. We will use the notation B Y l x c to denote their probability of outputting y given Xc . We refer to the parameters B Y l x c as the 'strategy' or the 'attack' .
The tracer tries to identify at least one of the colluders, based on the information available to him: the p, X, and y values in all the positions. We consider a class of algorithms known as 'simple decoder', in which a score is assigned to each user j E [n] separately. More specifically, we consider single-position contributions Sj that are added up. If the sum exceeds some threshold, user j is 'accused'. The maximum tolerable probability that a fixed innocent user gets accused is denoted as C l .
In the decoder that we consider, the single-position scores are computed as Sj = h(Xj, y,p),
where h is some function and the position index on Sj , Xj , Y and p is omitted. Without loss of generality, we will consider only score functions h such that the expectation value of an innocent user's score is zero. We call such score functions centered. (One can shift a non-centered h by a constant to make it centered, without changing the properties of the scheme at all.)
The generalized (q-ary) Tardos scheme [15] has
This score function has the important property that the score of an innocent user has expectation zero and variance equal to one. This property, which to a large extent fixes the statistical behavior of the innocent scores, makes it easy to specify a collusion strategy independent accusation threshold as a function of the tolerable false positive probability C l ; hence it allows for a low-complexity decoder algorithm.
B. Asymptotic analysis
We focus on the asymptotic (large c, with n/c fixed)
analysis of the bias-based tracing scheme. We will need to compute expectation values over all probabilistic degrees of freedom: the biases p, the code word symbols X, and the coalition outputs y. The notation for the complete expectation will be IE , whereas expectation with respect to p has notation IEp etc.
A noteworthy variable is the tally of symbols received by the coalition. We define ma = 1 {j E C : Xj = a} I . In words: ma counts how many colluders have received symbol a. In each position the tally adds up to c: we have L a EQ ma = c.
Here (�) stands for the multinomial coefficient el/ IL ma!. We will often use the multi-index notation p m = IT a EQ P�Q and for a scalar s , pS = IT a P� .
The collective coalition score Sc in a certain position is defined as
Two important statistical quantities were introduced [7] : the expectation Me of the coalition score and the variance arnn of an innocent's score. The first one is given by a EQ IEpIEmlpIEylm [ L mah(a, y,p)]. a EQ (6) Remark 1: Me may depend on the (omitted) position index i;
this happens when the attack strategy has explicit position dependence, breaking the synunetry that is present in the code generation and tracing algorithms. p, m, y) ]. Now the probability of Xc occurring given p satisfies PX e lp ex. IT j E c P Xj = p m ex. P mlp -In other words, all the p-dependence in PX e lp is already contained in P mlp . Hence for given m, the distribution of Xc has no extra dependence on p, which allows us to write IExe lpm = IExe lm and therefore IExe lpmIE Y IXe = IEylm' yielding (6).
The second statistical quantity is, for j 1. C and a centered score function,
x EQ
In the first line we have used that the expectation of Sj is zero. In the second line we have used that Xj Ip and yip are independent for an innocent user j, and in the third line that PXj lp = P Xj " Note that P y lp can be extremely complicated, containing expectations over all bias vectors, coalition symbols and coalition outputs in other positions.
For any function z (p) we have
Jo a EQ Here the notation J d q p stands for integration over the hyper cube p E [0, l] Q , and the Dirac delta function 0(1 -L a P a) enforces the constraint L a Pa = l .
Further on we will encounter Dirichlet integrals, also known as generalized Beta functions. Let v E (0, oo) q be a vector,
. o a � a � Here f is the Gamma function, with the property f (l + x) = xf(x).
Asymptotically the performance of the simple-decoder trac ing scheme as described above depends on a single parameter, namely the fr action Me! ainn [7] . Asymptotically, the sufficient code length f! and the fingerprinting rate R are given by Here it is implicit that fiel ainn is averaged over all positions if necessary. (Which is only the case for symmetry-breaking strategies ).
III. A NEW SCORE FUNCTION AND BIAS DISTRIBUTION
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new simple-decoder score function for q-ary fingerprinting,
Here Jxy is a Kronecker delta; the aq [F] is a (positive) F dependent normalization constant that makes sure that af nn = 1 and that the symmetric score function (2) is re-obtained at q = 2.
The score (11) has the following properties, which hold for any bias distribution F,
• An innocent user's score has expectation value zero.
• The variance of an innocent user's score is one.
• The expectation value of the coalition score does not depend on the collusion strategy. Furthermore, we find that the following bias distribution maximizes the performance indicator fiel ainn,
where Nq is a normalization constant. With this choice of F, the normalization constant becomes aq [F] = l /Nq .
Eqs. (11) and (13) together form a 'cleaner' generalization of the symmetric binary score system to q-ary alpabets than the earlier scheme [15] , in the sense that it preserves more of the strategy-independence properties. Below we prove all the above mentioned claims one by one. 
fu nction satisfies
Th eorem 1: Th e score fu nction (11) is strongly centered.
Proof The sum L XEQ Px h(x, y,p) is proportional to
In the first equality we used L x Px = 1. In the last step we used L x ( _ 1 ) H8 xy = 2 -q.
D
Th eorem 2: 1f the score fu nction (11) is used, the variance of an innocent user's score is equal to one.
Proof Eq. (7) evaluates to -2 (J inn a� [F] ( 1 6)
In the last line we have used L x Px = 1 and L x ( -1 ) 1 + Oxy = 2-q. The expression between brackets in ( 1 6) does not depend on y; hence the expectation lE Yl p is trivial and ( 1 6) reduces to a;; 2 , with aq as defined by (12) . D Th eorem 3: The score fu nction (11) gives independent of the colluder strategy.
Proof We write
a EQ p Py a EQ P a and substitute this into (6) . The expectation of the first term is
For the expectation of the third term in (18) we use the fact that lErnlpma = CPa and obtain Here it is implicit that all the m-vectors in the summation satisfy L a ma = c. The lEp is computed as follows,
Here lq denotes the q-component vector (I, 1 , ... , I), and ey is a q-component vector consisting of all zeroes except in position y, i.e. (ey)a = Jay . Substitution of (20) into (19) gives (2 1) In the last equality we have used that 1/ F(p) does not depend on m and y. Adding T l + T 2 + T3 we get (13) .
Proof The ainn is equal to 1. We minimize P"Z2 under the constraint IEp [l] = 1 using the Euler-Lagrange method.
From (17) we see that this is equivalent to minimizing 
Solving for F, and respecting the normalization constraint, yields (13) . D Th eorem 5: Fo r q = 2, the combination of the score fu n ction (11) with the bias distribution (13) reproduces the binary symmetric scheme of [15] with zero cutoff.
Proof For q = 2 the bias function (13) is (I/N 2 ) VLa p;:; l = (I/N 2 )(I L P a)-1/2 and the normalization constant reduces to N 2 = 1r. This is precisely the arcsine distribution f(p) = (1/7r) [ p(1 -p)]-1/2 as introduced by Tardos [1] .
For q = 2 Eq. (11) gives h(y, y, p ) = V"' (I ":;" --"---p y """' ) ""' /p -y , and for x -I-y: h(x, y, p ) = -v (1 -Px )/ Px = -J p y /(I -p y ). This is the old score system (2) . D The asymptotic code length parameter A q and the asymp totic fingerprinting rate parameter 1/( A q In q) are plotted in Fig. 1 . The rate parameter decreases as a function of q, whereas the fingerprinting capacity increases. 
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summarizing, we have introduced a q-ary generalization of the binary symmetrized Tardos scheme which preserves the strategy-independent properties of the binary scheme. The bias distribution is given by (14) and the generalization of the score function 
V L a P � -(q -2) 2
This combination of bias distribution and score function yields a ;n n = 1 and Pc = Nc,d -2 )!' with N q as defined in (14) .
In spite of all the nice properties, it turns out that, as far as we can see from the numerics, the asymptotic fingerprinting rate is a decreasing function of the alphabet size q; the new scheme performs worse than other q-ary schemes known in the literature.
The analysis in this paper is brief and focuses on large-c asymptotics. In spite of its bad asymptotic performance, our newly found scheme may have a role to play at small coalition sizes.
